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Recalcitrance or Redemption? The Contested Legacy of 
Britain’s Iron Lady 
 




“Where there is discord, may we bring harmony,” uttered Margaret 
Thatcher as she stood on the doorstep of 10 Downing Street in May, 
1979.1 Despite the solemnity of her Franciscan supplication, rarely has a 
prayer so manifestly gone unanswered in both life and death. As flags at 
Parliament, Buckingham, and across the United Kingdom were lowered 
to half-staff, Prime Minister David Cameron lauded Thatcher as having 
“saved our country.”2 Salvation, however, is a relative term these days, 
and for those who, upon hearing of the baroness’ death, celebrated in the 
streets of Brixton or for the working-class coal mining families of 
Yorkshire and the Humber in the North Country, Thatcher’s erstwhile 
cauterization of Britain’s industrial sectors brought only condemnation. 
“The Queen was sad to hear the news of the death of Baroness Thatcher. 
Her Majesty will be sending a private message of sympathy to the 
family,” Buckingham Palace dutifully reported.3 The Queen, along with 
the National Health Service, shared the distinction as essentially the only 
two bodies that Thatcher had failed to privatize during her stretch as 
prime minister. The latter attempt, at least, was not from a lack of want. 
She was “The Woman Who Divided a Nation,” wrote one Labourite 
tabloid, the Daily Mirror. Millennials did what they do best and took to 
Facebook, and blitzed YouTube with an anti-Thatcher campaign that 
netted the seventy-four-year-old song, “Ding Dong! The Witch Is Dead;” 
top spot on UK charts (not quite the reappearance Dorothy had 
envisioned). Always one to keep the political rhetoric close to the privy, 




1 “1979: Election Victory for Margaret Thatcher,” BBC News, May 4, 1979, 
accessed June 8, 2013. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/4/newsid_2503000/250319 
5.stm. Thatcher paraphrases a stanza from the Prayer of Saint Francis (English 
version). 
2 Erin McClam, “Margaret Thatcher, 'Iron Lady' Who Led Conservative 
Resurgence in Britain, Dies at 87” NBC News, April 8, 2013, accessed June 8, 
2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/08/17653388-.html. 
3 “Queen Saddened by Thatcher’s Death,” MSN News, April 8, 2013, accessed 
June 8, 2013, 
http://news.uk.msn.com/uk/queen-saddened-by-thatchers-death. 
187  
In Memoriam  
 
 
“Tramp the dirt down” on his Twitter feed.4 For many, the soul-snatching 
economic bargain that the baroness had struck with the British people, 




Composing a Legacy: Historiography and Hagiography 
 
In Europe’s post-war era, there were few individuals who were as 
polarizing as Margaret Hilda Thatcher. Although entrepreneurs have  
sung dirges for many of her contemporaries, her own legacy, in many 
ways, remains a divided house. Without question, Thatcher has had a 
seismic impact on the British scene. Not even Galloway would dispute 
this. How has Thatcherism shaped our world, however? What, in fact, is 
her legacy? Attempts to galvanize her story began early.5 In 1987,  
Dennis Kavanagh, Professor of Politics at the University of Liverpool, 
chided the so-called “Thatcher experiment” for having sounded the death 
knell for the post-war Keynesian consensus.6 Apparently, one could do 
worse, at least according to Martin Holmes, who hailed the prime 
minister’s monetarist principles as an “impressive economic 
achievement.”7 Despite an exhaustive reading of Thatcher’s initial 
economic policies, Holmes’ first-term impressions nearly border on the 
quixotic, as the mounting unemployment rate and onerous deregulatory 
practices are noticeably omitted in favor of his own government 
assessment, that is, predictably, one of “sustained success.”8 In his door- 
stopping biography, The Iron Lady, Hugo Young presents Thatcher as an 
indomitable, yet flawed, political force.9 Perhaps an even greater 
personalized depiction of Thatcher can be found in Peter Jenkins’ Mrs. 
Thatcher’s Revolution. The author, by virtue of being a former lobby 
 
4 “Anger at George Galloway's 'tramp the dirt down' Twitter Remark after 
Thatcher's Death,” London Evening Standard, April 8, 2013, accessed June 8, 
2013, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/anger-at-george-galloways- 
tramp-the-dirt-down-twitter-remark-after-thatchers-death-8564876.html. 
Galloway’s quip, “Tramp the dirt down,” was the title of a 1988 Elvis Costello 
song berating the then-prime minister. 
5 James Douglas, “The Changing Tide-Some Recent Studies of Thatcherism,” 
British Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (1989): 399–403. 
6 Dennis, Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus? 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 6–10. 
7 Martin Holmes, The First Thatcher Government (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1985), 68. 
8 Ibid. For an overview of Holmes’ work, see Philippe Sands, review of “The 
First Thatcher Government, by Martin Holmes and Thatcher: The First Term by 
Patrick Cosgrave,” Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 9, 
no. 2 (1986): 453. 
9 Hugo Young, The Iron Lady: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher (New York: 
Macmillan London, 1989). 
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correspondent, attributes the sui generis “Thatcher Factor” as the primary 
catalyst for Britain’s economic and geopolitical policies.10 In contrast, 
Joel Krieger, William Keegan, and to a lesser degree Kavanagh, argue 
that the centralizing agents of Thatcherism had more to do with the 
widespread breakdown of the post-war consensus, and less with a  
“simple provincial [Thatcher] looking for an uncomplicated 
philosophy.”11 In 2005’s widely read Postwar, Tony Judt masterfully 
tailors Thatcher to fit within the milieu of the 1980s before settling on an 
evenhanded legacy of economic efficiency offset by social 
fragmentation.12 
In an effort to develop a greater understanding of her legacy, two 
determinative events during Thatcher’s tenure as UK prime minister are 
revisited and examined. First, Thatcher’s prosecution of the war to 
reclaim the Falklands in 1982 is explored. The result of the conflict led to 
an ensuing groundswell of popularity for Thatcher, which propelled her  
to success during the elections of 1983. Throughout the literature, there   
is a parting of ways when it comes to the Argentinian affair and the so- 
called Falklands Factor, its redeeming role within the British psyche, and 
its novel influence on England’s connection to Thatcher. In large part,  
the tactical considerations of the engagement have become intertwined 
within disparate political interests, further complicating the issue; 
nevertheless, these are the strings that will be pulled. Secondly, 
Thatcher’s engagement in the UK miners’ strike of 1984–85 is 
considered. It is quite possible that without the victory in the Falklands, 
Thatcher’s curbing of union power would not have transpired following 
the year-long standoff with the coal industry in places like Yorkshire, 
County Durham, and Nottinghamshire. It did, nonetheless, and became 
for many— especially those on the far left—an unpardonable sin. In 
examining these two determinative events, it is suggested that Thatcher 
emerged as a polarizing, yet unique political phenomenon, whose legacy 
of determination and intransigence was shaped by her self-identification 




The Falklands Crisis 
 
During the winter of 1981, General Leopoldo Galtieri’s military junta 
seized control of Buenos Aires. Argentina’s aggression nearly eight 
 
10 Peter Jenkins, Mrs. Thatcher’s Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 1988). 
11William Keegan, Mrs. Thatcher’s Economic Experiment (London: Allen Lane, 
1984), 82; and Joel Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1986). 
12 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2005), 543. 
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thousand miles away, mobilized the languid British government and 
provided Thatcher with a dress rehearsal for a decade of confrontation, 
both at home and abroad. For Thatcher, who was already embroiled in 
panoply of parliamentary issues in London, while simultaneously 
monitoring the decolonization of Rhodesia in southern Africa, the 
Argentinian crisis initially found her ill-prepared and reluctant to 
prosecute a war on foreign soil. In large part, Buenos Aires’ saber 
rattling and martial overtures to the Foreign Office had fallen on deaf 
ears, and following the 1981 Defence Review’s budgetary 
recommendation to withdraw the HMS Endurance from its maritime 
coordinates near the Southern Cone, the Argentinians invaded.13 The 
subsequent war to reclaim the Falkland Islands (April 2- June 14, 1982) 
left an indelible impression upon the Iron Lady, as it claimed the lives of 
255 British and over 650 Argentinians: 
 
Nothing remains more vividly in my mind, looking back 
on my years in No. 10, than the eleven weeks in the 
spring of 1982 when Britain fought and won the 
Falklands War. Much was at stake: what we were 
fighting for eight thousand miles away in the South 
Atlantic was not only the territory and the people of the 
Falklands, important though they were. We were 
defending our honour as a nation, and principles of 
fundamental importance to the whole world—above all, 
that aggressors should never succeed and that 
international law should prevail over the use of force. 
The war was very sudden. No one predicted the 
Argentine invasion more than a few hours in advance, 
though many predicted it in retrospect. When I became 
Prime Minister I never thought that I would have to 
order British troops into combat and I do not think I 
have ever lived so tensely or intensely as during the 
whole of that time.14 
 
Part revisionist, post-colonial romanticist, heroine, apologist, and 
polemicist—even in perpetuity—Thatcher’s historical seating chart 
makes for contentious dinnertime conversations. Within her private 
recollections, compiled a decade after the conclusion of the war, it is as if 
she is still on the floor of the House of Commons, staring down the 
opposition party across the aisle, sparring with—and even attacking—her 
 
 
13 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 
1993), 174. Thatcher attributes the date of the Argentinian invasion to the 150th 
anniversary of formal British rule on the archipelago. 
14 Ibid., 173. 
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Labourite interlocutors; and defending herself against the charge of 
unpreparedness.15 The charge, however, was not completely unfounded. 
Besides, the Falklands were not exactly the crown jewel of what was left 
of the empire, and the size of the garrison at Port Stanley was far from 
Napoleonic (the London Philharmonic Orchestra could field more men 
than the Royal Marines garrison there).16 
Following Argentina’s invasion on April 1, a BBC radio 
producer, catching wind of the rumored offensive, made an inquiry at the 
Foreign Office, in London, only to be told by the duty officer that Port 
Stanley remained a haven of tranquility.17 Unalarmed, both men went 
their separate ways as Argentine commandos stormed the Moody Brook 
barracks eight thousand miles away. Appearing before the Commons two 
days later, in what Thatcher described as “the most difficult [debate] I 
ever had to face,” she reported that the Argentinian landing had not been 
confirmed until 8:30 that morning (following a conversation with Sir Rex 
Hunt, governor of the Falkland Islands).18 Needless to say, the chamber 
erupted in a fit of “bulldog outrage.”19 Yet, the MPs knew what was at 
stake, especially those who painfully recalled Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden’s ill-fated adventurism in the Sinai Peninsula, which had fettered  
the collective conscience of a generation of British to the broadcasted 
humiliation of the Suez Crisis in 1956.20 To be sure, the weight of the 
 
 
15 Ibid., 183. 
16 Robin Harris, The Collected Speeches of Margaret Thatcher (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1997), 154. Misplacing colonial territories in the South Seas had 
not been without precedent. In late 1976, the Argentinian junta, apparently in 
need of a military victory, invaded the barren British dependency in the far- 
flung territory of Southern Thule, “boldly” capturing a number of its penguin 
and petrel inhabitants. Despite the Argentinian Air Force setting up shop on 
sovereign British territory, David Owen, the foreign secretary under Callaghan 
at the time, decided to cover up the incident rather than complicate relations with 
Buenos Aires. The House was not informed until a British Antarctic survey ship, 
the ice-strengthened RRS Bransfield, finally cruised past Southern Thule two 
years later and noticed the Argentinian regulars. Losing the territories that you 
know about was quite disconcerting, but to be made aware of your downsizing 
two Christmases later was particularly dreadful. 
17 Young, The Iron Lady, 264. 
18 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 180. 
19 Young, The Iron Lady, 264. 
20 While the Union Jack emerged from World War II at half-staff, it took the ill- 
advised Anglo-Franco clandestine incursion (1956) into the Suez to demonstrate 
to Britain what the world already knew: despite retaining some vestige of 
imperialism, Britain success ultimately depended on US consent; and, clearer 
still, imperialists and their intrigues linger long after their seat of power has 
gone. This appeared particularly obvious to everyone, but the British and their 
tripartite conspirators. Perhaps, not since the Children’s Crusade to the Holy 
Land, has an undertaking invited such calamity and embarrassment as Eden and 
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moment was not lost on the prime minister, who was well aware that a 
military defeat in the Falklands would be devastating to the United 
Kingdom. Thatcher’s strategy during the debate on the House floor that 
night was twofold: first, remind the Chamber that territory in the South 
Sandwich Islands had also been lost under Callaghan’s watch; and 
second, dispel any attempt to link her tardy response to the foreign policy 
foibles of the previous administration. To ensure that the Iron Lady was 
not about to dilute her ore, Enoch Powell stood in the Chamber and 
reminded everyone of the prime minister being dubbed the “Iron Lady,” 
and that now was the time to “learn what metal she is made of.”21 
There is no doubt that for supporters of Thatcher, retaking the 
Falklands by force would be a seminal moment of her legacy. With that 
in mind, and amidst a crisis in domestic unpopularity, Thatcher leapt  
onto the well-traveled path to Britain’s War Room, anxious to exorcise 
the demons of the past. The former research-chemist from Lincolnshire, 
however, appeared remarkably well equipped for repelling the Galtieri 
junta and defending Britain’s honor on the high seas. After British forces 
defeated the Argentinians in South Georgia on April 25, Thatcher 
beseeched Londoners to praise the effort and sacrifice of the British Task 
Force.22 Her celebratory proclamations soon proved prophetic as the 
Falklands campaign, following the controversial sinking of the 
Argentinian light cruiser, General Belgrano, by the British submarine, 
HMS Conqueror, drew to a close in mid-June as white flags were hoisted 
over Port Stanley. Soon after learning the news that weary Argentinian 
troops had thrown down their arms and begun to retreat, Thatcher 
addressed the nation: 
 
 
Guy Mollet’s false-flag theatrics along the Sinai Peninsula. Moreover, not only 
was President Eisenhower excluded from Britain’s Suez ambitions, but also 
Eden’s face-off with Gamal Nasser over the “jugular vein of the empire” 
coincided, almost to the hour, with the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Eden’s 
chronological misstep—which doubled as his political gravedigger—infuriated 
Eisenhower, and collectively saddled Britain with an identity crisis that, in some 
cases, was not rehabilitated until Thatcher crossed swords with Argentina over 
the Falklands in 1982. Besides, the cold warriors in Washington had little 
patience for the parlor room colluding of Paris and London, especially when 
Soviet tanks were simultaneously rolling over barricades in Budapest. For other 
samples of Britain’s perspective of the Suez, in particular, those exhibited by the 
Suez group, see Leon D. Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis (Urban, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1964), 51-60. 
21 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 184. In a footnote, Thatcher explains 
that Powell returned and made the subject a Parliamentary Question. Not 
surprisingly, the report showed her substance to be of the highest quality. After 
Powell’s findings were printed and framed, they were hung on Thatcher’s office 
wall. 
22Young, The Iron Lady, 273. 
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And so today we can rejoice at our success in the 
Falklands and take pride in the achievement of the men 
and women of our task force. But we do so, not as at 
some flickering of a flame which must soon be dead. 
No—we rejoice that Britain has rekindled that spirit 
which has fired her for generations past and which today 
had begun to burn as brightly as before. Britain found 
herself again in the South Atlantic and will not look back 
from the victory she has won.23 
 
 
The Spirit of the Falklands 
 
Indeed, the shadow of the Falklands conflict would loom over Thatcher 
more than any other event during her tenure as prime minister. In 
retrospect, it is clear that the Falklands spirit was never meant to be 
geographically confined to a rocky archipelago in the South Atlantic; 
instead, it was to be a salve for the British psyche, which, if embraced, 
would collectively lift the English from their post-colonial malaise.24 
Britain had been suffering from a self-imposed imperial coma ever since 
Winston Churchill had enjoyed his last habanos and now, following a 
quarrel over an unwelcoming windswept rock in the southerly part of the 
dependencies, the empire was ready to get back to what empires do: 
rule.25 This pursuit was one that Margaret Thatcher was more than 
 
 
23 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 235. 
24 Hulmut Norpoth, “The Falklands War and Government Popularity in Britain: 
Rally without Consequence or Surge without Decline?” Electoral Studies 6, no. 
1 (1987): 7-13. 
25 Fueled by an awakened nationalistic fervor, the process of decolonization 
became the post-war reality for the former great powers: England, France, and 
the Netherlands. Indeed, by 1960, Conservative Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan’s concessionary “Wind of Change” speech in Cape Town stood in 
stark contrast to the ostentations of Cecil Rhodes’ “Cape to Cairo” goal from a 
generation before. The British Empire’s topographical fetishism, proudly 
inculcated in the English youth upon entering grammar school, and infamously 
portrayed in the sketch of Rhodes, seen straddling the African continent, had 
unceremoniously collapsed into sheer bourgeois nostalgia in less than twenty 
post-war-years. This was only one side of the coin, however, in respect to 
Britain’s incapacity to maintain its territorial holdings. The other side was the 
post-war ascendancy of the US, which despite sharing the ideological spoils of 
war with its ally, fortuitously failed to share Britain’s dire need for fiscal 
prophylactics and post-war damage control, especially following Japan’s 
insertion into the “Impregnable Fortress” in the British stronghold of Singapore 
in 1942 (Churchill christened the fall of Singapore as the “largest capitulation” 
in British history). Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, vol. 4 (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 81. Henceforth, Britain found itself 
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obliged to accept. In the aftermath of the war, Thatcher’s approval 
ratings sharply climbed to forty-four percent which, given her basement- 
dwelling approval ratings from the previous year, nearly suggested 
revolution.26 
For many, however, there was a darker side to the legacy of the 
Falklands spirit. For the naysayers, Thatcher’s triumphant adventurism  
on the high seas had more to do with sheer serendipity than sound 
leadership. Curiously, the Madame Prime Minister’s luck appeared to be 
transatlantic.27 At home, she had reached the top of the greasy pole, as 
Benjamin Disraeli called the game of politics, by running against an  
inept Labour Party, in 1979, which was spoken for by the political leper, 
Michael Foot. While abroad, her coterie of opponents appeared to have 
curiously fallen from the same sick tree. This unified front of futility 
allowed Thatcher to seamlessly transfer her Downing Street manners and 
political temperament into the War Cabinet with relative ease. Giving 
traction to this back-story was the revelation, that on multiple occasions, 
Argentinian shells fortuitously failed to detonate after penetrating British 
steel on the stormy South Seas.28 Considering its lauded maritime 
bullishness and the flow of US-supplied Sidewinder missiles and 
logistical support, Britain’s routing of the junta’s Armada was not as 
inspiring as it was once thought to be. 
Almost everything the government attempted was in some way 
interconnected with the Falklands factor. For Thatcher, who had already 
been given the sobriquet The Iron Lady by a Moscow propagandist no 
less, the Falklands triumph legitimized her military prowess, emboldened 
her electorate base, and perhaps, most significantly, reaffirmed her 
conviction to remake the domestic scene. Yet, not all shared the post-war 
afterglow. If Thatcher’s thick-skinned indifference and notorious 
harshness toward her cabinet members was barely tolerable before 
Argentina’s surrender during her first term, then what was one to expect 
from her second term? Even after her death, Thatcher’s fidelity to the 
spirit of the Falklands remains a point of variance among dyed-in-the- 
wool Thatcherites, jilted-maudlin Labourites, and fellow-travelers. 
Following her death, Gary Younge, writing in The Nation, scolded 






parrying “client state” accusations, as post-war reshuffling now compelled 
London to consult Washington prior to acting on the global stage. For a further 
treatment of post-war Britain’s imperial demise, see Guy Arnold, Britain since 
1945: Choice, Conflict and Change (London: Blandford, 1989), 41-49. 
26 Young, The Iron Lady, 280. 
27 Ibid., 279-280. 
28 Ibid. 
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Falklands War.29 Further tarnishing her reputation was the surfacing of 
details regarding the authorized sinking of the Belgrano (in which 368 
sailors drowned) while it was outside of the Exclusion Zone near the 
Falklands. Later, at Chequers, while entertaining a prominent group of 
artists, including Andrew Lloyd-Webber, Thatcher, while surveying the 
furniture, proudly noted the corner chair in which she had sat when she 
elected to scuttle the Belgrano.30 Her triumphal bearing is noticeably 
missing in The Downing Street Years, in which she describes the 
Belgrano sailing on the edge of the Exclusion Zone while the ship’s 
“poor state of battle readiness greatly increased the casualties.”31 She 
goes on to blame the Belgrano’s escorts for failing to rescue the  
drowning seamen. No longer writing from the “Belgrano chair,” the once 
warrior-queen had seemingly become a queen apologist. The same spear 
that was used to claim her greatest victory had now splintered in her 
hand. The immediate effect that the Falklands had on Thatcher, however, 
was much less fragmented. 
In the aftermath of victory, the prime minister gloried in her 
newfound Churchillian radiance. The nation, it seemed, had been reborn. 
Whatever doubt remained in Thatcher’s mind regarding the rectitude of 
her intentions, either foreign or domestic, and her ability to superintend 
those aims, was soon to join the Belgrano. Meanwhile, after the eleven- 
week campaign had ended, and Thatcher returned to more civil matters, 
she appeared unable to temper the tenacity that she had enthusiastically 
displayed within the War Cabinet. The transition was unsettling. After 
the hated governing junta had capitulated, Thatcher’s gunboat diplomacy 
turned its bowsprit north, navigated away from the South Atlantic, and 
sailed straight up the Thames. Torpedoing the hull of an Argentinian 
cruiser required a particular type of mettle, alleviating public squalor in 
Bristol and Manchester another. Or did it? 
 
 
The Falklands Reconsidered 
 
Once the Parliamentary backslapping abated and the singing of “Rule 
Britannia” had been drowned-out by economic woes, questions began to 
surface regarding the Falklands’ pre-history and Thatcher’s retaking of 
the islands. The questions and details surrounding the decision to sink the 
Belgrano, curiously became murkier as the fog of war lifted. Predictably, 
the prime minister was not about to open the door to such solicitations. It 
may have begun to drizzle, but Thatcher was not quite done parading. 
 
29 Gary Younge, “How Did Thatcher Do It?” The Nation, April 29, 2013, 
accessed June 8, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/173732/how-did- 
margaret-thatcher-do-it. 
30 Young, The Iron Lady, 277. 
31 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 215. 
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Nonetheless, thunderclouds were appearing. Once it surfaced that the 
Belgrano had been sailing away from the Falklands and not toward the 
islands, as the British people had been mistakenly led to believe, the 
pretext for sinking the moribund vessel came into question. When  
pressed regarding the discrepancy during a BBC Television interview, a 
visibly annoyed Thatcher nearly sparked a political grease fire when she 
protested that the ship “was not sailing away from the Falklands.”32 
Apparently, her compass needed recalibrating. When it was later  
revealed that a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defense, Clive 
Ponting, had secretly leaked incriminating details of what had actually 
happened to the vessel in the cold waters of the South Atlantic, he was 
swiftly prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act of 1911.33 Although 
Ponting was later acquitted, the Iron Lady emerged from her televised fit 
of vapors having lost some of her luster. For many, Ponting’s indictment 
and trial evidenced another attempt by Mrs. Thatcher to ghostwrite her 
post-Falklands hagiography, a narrative, which largely due to a yeoman’s 
work of editing, would read well during her re-election in 1983. 
For Thatcher’s supporters, the Argentinian campaign reflected 
her ability to make top-level decisions, take risks, and confront 
tremendous obstacles. During the crisis, she noticeably eschewed her 
own diplomats for the company of admirals and generals. Having been 
the only female member of the Carlton Club since 1975, she was well 
versed in the posing and overcompensation typically characteristic at all- 
male gatherings. Thatcher was as comfortable on the shop floor as she 
was with shoptalk. Parliament soon discovered, to the dismay of many, 
that she was better suited for administering the gladiatorial thumbs-down 
to the beleaguered Belgrano than negotiating with trade unions. These 
traits served her well during wartime, as certain occasions require 
specific skill sets. According to Anthony King, could anyone other than 
de Gaulle have pulled France’s chestnuts out of the fire in Algeria? 
Would either Heath or Callaghan have engaged in a fight with the 
Galtieri junta?34 
On the other hand, much of this triumphalism was a mere 
papering-over of the cracks in the edifice. Amidst accusations of having 
mismanaged the war and misleading the public, victory nevertheless 
convinced Thatcher of her own righteousness. “The Old Testament 
prophets did not say, 'Brothers, I want a consensus,'" she once remarked. 
"They said, 'This is my faith. This is what I passionately believe. If you 
 
32 “Margaret Thatcher on Nationwide Questioned over the Belgrano,” 5:49, from 
a televised interview for “Nationwide” on BBC Television May 24, 1983, posted 
by “harmlessdrudge1986,” May 5, 2013, accessed June 8, 2013, YouTube video, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JZlP5qQVtE. 
33 Young, The Iron Lady, 287. 
34 Anthony King, “The Outsider as Political Leader: The Case of Margaret 
Thatcher,” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 3 (2002): 453. 
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believe it, too, then come with me;" coincidentally, not long after His 
Holiness, Pope John Paul II, would pay her a visit in London.35 At the 
height of her post-Falklands acme, Thatcher’s outsider-rebel status was 
smelted and fashioned into a formidable weapon, wielded at friend and 
foe alike. When it came to describing the relationship with her European 
ministerial colleagues, swimmingly would not have been the operative 
term. Political fratricide was never beneath her. She held an acute disdain 
for Conservative “wets” who, as W.H. Auden said of poets, make 
“nothing happen.”36 Anthony King reminds us “Thatcher became the  
first prime minister in British history to sack cabinet ministers on a large 
scale, not because they were incompetent, but because they disagreed 
with her.”37 The lady, who was famously “not for turning,” was also not 
for moderating, placating, or conceding. Either no one told her that the 
lion’s share of Old Testament prophets were killed by their own people, 
or she simply did not care. “But what Thatcherism stood for more than 
anything else was the ‘smack of firm government.’”38 
 
 
Thatcher and the UK Miners' Strike of 1984–85 
 
If West Africa was known as the “white man’s graveyard” during the late 
nineteenth century, then the coal union’s bargaining table was the 
Conservative man’s graveyard in the late twentieth century. As Thatcher 
dispensed the quinine and readied her cabinet in the spring of 1984, there 
were plenty of political scars still visible from the 1973–74 miners’ strike 
that had coughed up Conservative Prime Minister, Ted Heath. Despite 
Thatcher’s prophylactics, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)  
and its Marxist president, Arthur Scargill, held an almost Cromwellian 
power to make or break British governments, or at the very least, 
browbeat and threaten policymakers with their collection of Conservative 
pelts. Coal production had been in decline since the First World War, and 
by the time the post-war Labour Government, under Clement Attlee, had 
carried out their commitment for nationalization in 1947, production had 
decreased from 292 million tons to 187 million tons.39 “By the 1970s the 
coal mining industry had come to symbolize everything that was wrong 
with Britain,” grizzled Thatcher.40 Having had her moral clarity recently 
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honed in the Falklands, Thatcher looked at the NUM with the eyes of a 
hunter who had already tasted blood. The NUM was uncompetitive, 
inefficient, overstaffed, and domineering. Not only had they parasitized 
the post-war Keynesian welfare state, but as representatives of the British 
working class, they wielded powerful political cudgels as well. Thatcher, 
with the zealotry of an Old Testament prophet, wasted little time in 
conspiring to cut down the NUM. A blueprint for dealing a fatal blow to 
the unions had been floating about since the mid-1970s. The so-called 
Ridley Plan, named after Nicholas Ridley, a fellow Conservative who  
had held hands with Heath while heading toward electoral disaster in 
1973–74, called for a cold-blooded battle of attrition. Ridley’s script, no 
less, was a splendid slice of Machiavellian statecraft. The arrangement 
called for economic siege warfare combined with a well-trained, mobile 
police force, available to maintain order once desperate workers began to 
cross picket lines. To be sure, the plan was radical, perhaps too radical  
for Thatcher, at least during her first term. 
To no one’s surprise, and everyone’s anticipation, Scargill, short 
on stature and memory, described Thatcher’s re-election as “the worst 
national disaster for a hundred years.”41 Thatcher braced for a political 
duel. By autumn, both camps began to size up one another. Ian 
MacGregor, the man who had recently put British steel back in the black, 
was tapped by Thatcher to chair the National Coal Board (NCB) and 
participate in the difficult task of negotiating with the NUM. Thatcher 
and MacGregor’s prescription for the coal industry included cutting the 
workforce by sixty-four thousand over three years, decreasing coal  
output by twenty-five million tons, and closing a number of uneconomic 
pits on a pit-by-pit basis (i.e., by 1983, roughly seventy-five percent of 
coal pits were losing money).42 The prospect of closing uneconomic pits 
was anathema to Scargill, and any attempt by the union to doff its hat to 
conciliation was akin to mining a bad tooth. 
Meanwhile, as the standoff began to play out on the evening 
news, the NUM circulated the story that Thatcher had a secret hit list of 
pits due for closure--an accusation that Thatcher denies in The Downing 
Street Years.43 Forgoing the requisite national ballot, which required a 
fifty-five percent majority vote, Scargill instead called for a strike in 
Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire in March of 1984. By mid-year it was 
clear that MacGregor, then aged seventy, was beginning to tire. The man 
who Thatcher once described as her only equal had proven the prime 
minister’s excessive praise to be just that.44 The use of the Ridley Plan, 
however, now allowed Thatcher and the NCB to escape disaster and 
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redouble their efforts. The plan—akin to moves in a game of chess— 
called for: storing coal at the power stations and not the pit heads, check; 
for setting aside the funds necessary to maximize oil-fired power stations 
in order to offset diminishing coal output, check; for importing 
alternative power from France and Scotland, check; for cutting-off 
financial support to mining families, forcing the union to provide for 
them, check; and, finally, for deploying a substantial number of well- 
trained riot police, checkmate. 
 
 
The Strike Ends 
 
In September, the government’s negotiations were interrupted when 
Patrick Magee, a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), detonated 
a long-delay time bomb next to Thatcher’s suite at the Grand Hotel in 
Brighton as she prepared to deliver a speech at a Conservative Party 
conference. The explosion waylaid the Conservative leadership, killing 
five and wounding thirty-one. Thatcher, who was working on her speech, 
at 2:54 a.m., barely skirted the blast as it buckled the second floor of the 
Grand Hotel and rearranged the prime minister’s lavatory.45 England was 
appalled; not since the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 had conspirators so 
brazenly attempted to assassinate a British head of state. Thatcher 
emerged unscathed, undaunted, and unyielding as she redoubled her 
convictions the following morning and delivered her speech as  
scheduled. In retrospect, her survival had less to do with the rectitude of 
her Victorian morals and more with the resilience of Victorian 
architecture. The IRA’s handiwork might have left a heavy footprint on 
the Grand Hotel, but the old façade’s structural integrity proved salvific 
for the Iron Lady. The entire sordid affair was disastrous for Scargill and 
the NUM. Smelling blood, Thatcher wasted no time. “These are the very 
dangers which we face in Britain today. At one end of the spectrum are 
the terrorist gangs within our borders, and the terrorist states, which 
finance and arm them. At the other are the hard left operating inside our 
system, conspiring to use union power and the apparatus of local 
government to break, defy and subvert the laws,” remarked Thatcher to 
the Carlton Club following the bombing.46 Emboldened by her own  
brush with death, and aware of the window of public sympathy that she 
had been afforded since the attempt on her life, Thatcher out-flanked the 
opposition. During speeches and interviews, she began to preach that the 
far left was soft terrorism. As an avowed Marxist, Scargill was 
indubitably reproached as a public menace and security threat. The game 
was up for the NUM. While Britain was still reeling from the Brighton 
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Hotel bombing, Thatcher had snatched the lifejacket from a drowning 
Scargill. The Ridley Plan, which had been sewn in the defeat of the 1974 
coal strike, was now being reaped in the victory of the 1984 strike. 
Scargill’s final pleas amounted to no more than a deathbed confession, as 
coal miners across the country laced up their steel-toe boots and returned 
to the pits. After more than a year, the strike ended unceremoniously. 
The strike, however, was never solely about union rights. For 
Thatcher, the moralist, pitched battles were always distilled down to a 
conflict between good and evil, and she, more than anyone else, knew 
which side she represented. Yet, much of Britain did not share her 
appetite for spiritual warfare. There was no self-congratulatory posturing 
or memorializing once the strike ended, and miners returned to work. 
Unlike during the Argentinian conflict, for most British people, there was 
no other during the standoff. Besides, the “real reason the miners’ strike 
failed was simple: At the 1983 election, only two out of five union 
members had voted Labour.”47 Having played the role of engaged 
bystander during the mass picketing, the British people were given a 
domestic encore to Thatcher’s critically acclaimed performance in the 
Falklands two years prior. Yet, the bullying and browbeating of one’s 
own countrymen is a far different matter. As much as Thatcher’s reading 
list included Friedrich von Hayek and Winston Churchill, it was her copy 
of Machiavelli’s The Prince that emerged from the yearlong strike dog- 
eared and well-exercised. As Judt said, “The British were once again 
being ruled.”48 
Notwithstanding the union’s overtures to the working man, once 
the strike had been terminated, the public’s affection for Scargill was 
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virtually nonexistent. However, neither was Downing Street bereft of 
blemish. Thatcher’s anti-trades union odyssey had whittled away the 
industrial and manufacturing sectors in the North, leaving three million 
British jobless by 1985. Judt surmised “by disdaining and dismantling all 
collectively-held resources, by vociferously insisting upon an 
individualist ethic that discounted any unquantifiable assets, Margaret 




Thatcherism: Alive and Well? 
 
Indeed, if the bureaucratic miasma and “stagflation” of the 1970s 
vindicated Hayek’s economic forecast, then Thatcher’s declawing of the 
militant labor unions (i.e., the Trades Union Congress lost seventeen 
percent of its membership within five years) legitimized her own 
prognostications. Under Thatcher, the Conservative Party had corralled 
inflation, humbled the labor force, curbed union power, and emboldened 
her middle-class constituency. Perhaps most telling is that the key tenets 
of Thatcherism are alive and well to this day. They debut each week 
during Questions to the Prime Minister. After Callaghan and Thatcher 
took consecutive turns at the wheel, veering first to the left, then to the 
far right, the keys were passed to Tony Blair who tried to stay between 
the lines. Even then, the ship of state still tacked to the right. When 
Thatcher was asked to name her greatest achievement, she gave the nod 
to Tony Blair, the practicing “Third Way” Labourite. Following her 
death in April, the Millennials who participated in the anti-Thatcher 
campaign on YouTube were no doubt responding to their parents and 





The Benefit of “Luck” 
 
In both life and death, Thatcher’s achievements were routinely dismissed 
as merely owing to luck (if one believes in such a thing) or favorable 
circumstances. “How Did Margaret Thatcher Do It?” rang the title of 
Gary Younge’s scabrous review in The Nation, following the 
announcement of her death in April.50 “She was lucky in her enemies,” 
decried Geoffrey Wheatcroft in the New Republic.51 There is something 
to be said for the shortcomings of Gorbachev and Galtieri, and the 
indolence within the Labour Party (nor did Scargill’s collectivist 
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imaginings cause anyone to forget Trotsky). This hand is often played, 
however. Even posthumously, Thatcher is able to elude these darts which 
are pulled from the pocket of the crowd who has grown accustom to 
twenty years of mealy-mouthed politicians on both sides of the pond. 
Besides, the “lucky” charge could be ascribed to any leader. Churchill 
was lucky not to catch a Pashtun bullet in the frontier region of British 
India. After writing over eight hundred pages in Postwar, many of  
which are dedicated to revolutions, Judt judiciously remarked that 
“Thatcher, like all the best revolutionaries, was fortunate in her 






For those not swayed by the whims of fortune and chance, there remain 
plenty of valid criticisms to direct at Thatcher. Most of her economic 
victories, despite their efficiency, were pyrrhic. Under the Iron Lady, 
unemployment skyrocketed and the majority of the populace, especially 
the working-class, suffered mightily.53 The neoliberal gauntlet of 
privatization and deregulation were ubiquitous during her three electoral 
victories. Her attempts to dismantle the welfare state were radical. The 
mass auctioning-off of public housing to tenants opened the housing 
market to speculation and saddled the middle-classes with a culture of 
debt, which they would pay for in spades during the property crash of the 






When cataloguing the entire Argentine engagement, there is an 
inescapable Manichaean proclivity to distil and divide Thatcher’s 
handling of the affair into terms of good or evil, saint or sinner. Despite 
holding onto this unrequited hope for clarity, however, rarely does life’s 
tree yield us such low hanging fruit. Inevitably, history will veil the facts, 
leaving us to run toward the warm embrace of simple speculation.  
Surely, however, life’s mosaic provides a more byzantine reading; at  
least it has in the case of Margaret Thatcher. 
Inasmuch as some authors, such as Martin Holmes, argue that 
Britain’s economy operated at a practiced cadence under Thatcher, 
others, such as Tony Judt, recall how British society foundered under her 
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tutelage. Following her death, two lines began to form behind these 
markers and spar over her legacy. Yet, these debates, while important, 
are limited in their explanatory scope. Like many discussions regarding 
an individual’s legacy, the long-term consequences and continuing 
effects often become the starting point from which people argue 
backward. While such a course may brush-in the background of the 
portrait, it often fails to paint the subject. 
In sketching Thatcher’s tactics during the Falklands War and the 
UK miners’ strike, one characteristic emerges alongside her legacy: that 
of an outsider-leader. Indeed, and for all of her peddling of free market 
liberalism and nouveau riche appeal, Thatcher was a provincial, born in 
bucolic Grantham, a grocer’s daughter. Within British Conservatism, she 
was an outsider who abjured consensus, reveled in Parliamentary 
brinkmanship, and shunned the conventional and despised Tory  
grandees. Depending on the company, she was always careful to either 
play up or play down her rearing as a petite bourgeoisie. Thatcher was 
fiercely independent, deeply suspicious, and rather adept at accumulating 
enemies. Self-identifying as an outsider characterized much of her 
legacy. Convinced of the soundness of her opinions and hemmed in by a 
coterie of ideological sycophants, Thatcher drew a non-negotiable ethical 
line in the sand. Those who chose to differ with her were considered 
turncoats. It was not the harmony of the Sermon on the Mount that  
stirred her, but the desert morality and righteous indignation of the sages 
in the Old Testament. It was from this moral fount that she drank  
heavily. Opposing governments, Marxist labor unions, welfare state 
apologists, and, as reported on occasion, visiting editors and mulish 
diplomats alike were conflated into a single roguish syndicate. 
Argentina’s Galtieri and the NUM’s Scargill were merely two heads of 
the same serpent-like Hydra. She dealt lead to the former and a lethal 
dose of Conservative retribution to the latter. Although the ethic of her 
legacy will continue to be disputed, her impact on British politics will 
not. “To anyone who had fallen asleep in England in 1978 and awoken 
twenty years later, their country would have seemed unfamiliar indeed: 
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